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Islamic Exceptionalism -- How Valid is the Concept of  �Islamic Human Rights�
Ebrahim Afsah
Introduction
�Nations are associates, not rivals in the grand social enterprise.� 
(Jermemy Bentham, cited in Oakeshott, 1993:101)
The debate over human rights is not confined to the protection of the individual from abuse,
but has wider and more consequential implications for the community of states. Nowhere
has this debate been more pronounced than between the Muslim world and the Christian
West. Both sides have grown accustomed to viewing each other as intrinsically different, the
very embodiment of �otherness�. This debate has often focused on the incompatibility of
cultures, as expressed for instance in presumably mutually exclusive conceptions of human
rights.
Based on the belief that there are no essential differences between people, including the
Christian West and the Islamic East, this paper argues that notions of human rights are not
the prerogative of any one cultural tradition but arose in response to the changing needs of
society. Such an analysis rejects the ahistorical view that sees the emergence of human
rights as the triumph of a particular cultural or religious tradition. Rather it regards the
emergence of individual rights as the �rules of the game� necessary to moderate the
dialectical struggle between different sections of society, and between state and society.
This view takes due notice of the impact of historical development and the socio-economic
level of societies, and permits a fuller understanding of international human rights. Seen
from this perspective the claims of cultural relativism, both Western and Islamic are
examined, arguing that human rights are best understood without reference to any particular
religious or cultural tradition.
This paper thus commences with a brief description of the claims to particularity often made
my adherents of political Islam. It is pointed out that the historical diversity and the various
reactions to modernity throughout the Muslim world make it very difficult, if not impossible to
identify any one authoritative version of Islam. 
Part three discusses in some detail the claims of both Western and Islamic proponents of
cultural relativism, concluding that relativist notions are not particularly helpful for our
understanding of international law, and particularly human rights norms. This is followed by a
discussion of the manipulation of relativist arguments for essentially political reasons, which
take remarkably similar forms across the Third World, raising certain doubts as to legitimacy
of the Islamist line of argument.
Part four examines the claim, often made by both Western and Islamic writers, about the sui
generis character of Islamic societies. By pointing out sociological, i.e. on-religious causes
for the rejection of Western models throughout the Muslim world, the section attempt to
refute claims to Islamic exceptionalism.
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Part five addresses the perceived genesis of international human rights norms from the
Western Judeo-Christian tradition. It maintains that religion-based explanations of human
rights are inferior to one that examines the secular sociological background behind the
emergence of such norms.
The conclusion restates the overall claim that the rejection of Western modernity expressed
in Islamist rhetoric must be understood in the context of popular exclusion and alienation
brought about by the advent of an overpowering modernity.
The Islamist Position
Many governments and some scholars have argued that international human rights
standards are to a large extent incompatible with the tenets of Islam. The argument is based
on two interrelated claims: that international human rights are a product of Western, i.e.
Judeo-Christian culture, and that these are in toto not compatible with the prescriptions of a
precisely identifiable, distinctly Islamic position on human rights. Provisions regarding
religious freedom (especially the freedom to change one�s religion), gender equality,
torture (i.e. shari�a sanctions that amount to cruel and unusual punishment), freedom of
expression, privacy (sanctity of home; dress code), the freedom of dissent and scientific
freedom, etc. have been found to be at variance with the Divine law.
Said and Nasser express the fundamental point of contention succinctly: �(Islamic) jurists
see human freedom in terms of personal surrender to the Divine Will. Freedom is not an
inherent right� (1980: 76-77). The US-Iranian philosopher Nasr argues similarly that the
human condition is geared towards servitude of God, freedom is therefore limited to the
freedom to do what is right. Absolute freedom remains a prerogative of the Divine:
�Personal freedom lies, in fact, in surrendering to the Divine Will.� (1980: 96-97).
While secular notions of human rights are based on the nature of man as a rational and
sentient being, Islamic notions of human rights are seen as emanating from a Divine
covenant: �When we speak of human rights in Islam we mean those rights granted by
God.� (Mawdudi, 1980: 15). Whatever the theological merits of such an approach, its
application to international human rights norms is questionable. It disregards the impact of
modernity and the historical struggles that brought forth the modern notion of human rights.
This flaw is elegantly summarised by Zakaria, who criticises the theocentric conception of
man behind this position and challenges it on two grounds: 
�It is non-historical, or rather it freezes a certain moment of history and holds fast to it till
the very end, thus doing away with dynamism, mobility and historical development. Finally,
it is non-empirical; it � seeks to imitate a theoretical and spiritual ideal, while completely
disregarding the effect of practice on this theoretical ideal.� (1986: 237).
The failure of the Islamist position to take into account the impact of historical forces is
discussed below in the context of the advent of modernity into traditional societies. But there
is a second, more serious, flaw in the argumentation of apologetics of Islamic human rights
schemes, which are based on the implicit or explicit assumption that there is such a thing as
the Islam. The traditional schism into distinct theological and judicial schools, together with
the fragmented response toward modernity render any attempt to construct a homogenous
concept of Islam a vacuous exercise. In the course of the century-old encounter between
the West and the Islamic Middle East, the retreating Islamic world has developed four
response patterns to meet the challenge (Farhang, 1988: 65):
Secularists have argued that Islamic societies are backward and must undergo fundamental
economic, socio-cultural, and legal reform to meet the technological and military challenge
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economic, socio-cultural, and legal reform to meet the technological and military challenge
posed by the West. A prime example would be Kemalist Turkey.
Traditionalists reject modern cultural and political ideas, and wish to retain traditional socio-
cultural values and authority structures. They do not reject the technological and
bureaucratic innovations of the West, but believe that these can be detached from the
�corrupting� aspects of Western life. The oil-rich Gulf monarchies are the most obvious
examples of this view. They believe that their wealth allows them to import only select
features of a generally alien and hostile West.
Religious modernists, in contrast, do accept the need for radical reform but maintain that it
must be grounded in a liberal and scientific interpretation of Islam. They thus reject the
wholesale adoption of Western mores and claim that the progressive aspects of Western
thought have already existed in early Islam. This approach was followed e.g. in the Tunisian
reform of personal status law in 1958.
Fundamentalists, reacting to the failure of both secularists and religious modernists to reach
a functioning synthesis between Islam and modernisation, portray the cultural encounter in
terms of a diametrical confrontation. Islam is seen as inherently superior to the Western
tradition, including both Capitalism and Marxism. The existential confrontation does not allow
for accommodation or pluralism, but posits Islam as the only moral order with themselves as
exclusive representatives of the Divine will. Khomeini is probably the best known
representative of this school of thought.
Apart from these largely political reactions in the modern age, it is important to bear in mind
the extraordinary variety that has characterised Islamic theology and jurisprudence from its
very inception, that led to the development of at least six equally authoritative traditions
which resulted in great variations in the interpretation of Islamic doctrine (Schacht, 1962).
Whatever the respective merits of the various schools, and the degree of cross-fertilisation
between them, there simply never existed a single authoritative interpretation of what
constitutes the proper canon islamicus. Farhang thus contrasts the broad scope of Islamic
law with its heterogeneous character, �despite the shari�a�s grasp of nearly all aspects
of individual and social life, there is no unified Islamic legal system, enshrined in integrated
codes and accepted by all Muslims� (1988: 65).
This crucial fact is often forgotten, not least with regard to the proper position of human
rights within Islam. The traditional fragmentation into co-existing theological schools,
together with the four broad patterns of response towards modernity which transgress the
classical division of the Divine law, render ad absurdum any attempt to speak of Islam as a
monolithical entity. Given this diversity, it is thus not surprising that Mayer finds that
�Muslims have taken many differing positions on human rights, including the unqualified
endorsement of international human rights standards as fully compatible with their culture
and religion.� (Mayer, 1991: 11-12).
Cultural Relativism 
The relativist position is founded on the belief in the fundamental �otherness� of Third
World societies, which makes Western concepts inapplicable. This position with regard to
human rights has been well expressed by Abul Aziz Said: 
�While the pursuit of human dignity is universal, its forms are designed by the cultures of
people. � [the] emphasis on Western common denominators projects a parochial view of
human rights that excludes the cultural realities and present existential conditions of Third
World societies.� (1979: 86).
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World societies.� (1979: 86).
This position further argues that condescending neo-colonialist attitudes show a lack of
respect for the sovereignty of Muslim countries. The criticism of non-western human rights
practices serves as a welcome vehicle to improve the Western image and discredit Islamic
culture as backward and primitive. By establishing the West�s inherent moral superiority,
the ultimate goal is to show �that Western political, economic, and cultural hegemony was
and is a natural and beneficial phenomenon for human kind.� (Mayer, 1991:8). 
Cultural relativism is a critique of such traditional Western scholarship about non-European
people. Edward Said�s Orientalism and his more recent Culture and Imperialism (1978,
1993) argue that such scholarship is not conducted in a spirit of scientific research but is
based on the racist assumption of Western superiority and Eastern inferiority. Such
scholarship posits an ineradicable barrier between the West and the East, obscuring the
common humanity of people, and thus dehumanising the Oriental (or African, etc.).
Orientalist scholarship thus serves the dual purpose of legitimising Imperialist ambitions, and
persuading the Oriental to accept his subjugation as the natural order by depriving him of
the intellectual means for self-realisation.
Inapplicability of Cultural Relativism
�A mutilation that these societies are inflicting on themselves on the pretext of preserving
their being.� 
(Arkoun, 1984:218) 
Cultural relativists condemn the notion that there are universal standards by which all
cultures can be judged, denying the legitimacy of using values taken from Western culture to
judge institutions of non-western cultures. They include international human rights norms
among these culture-dependent values, which cannot be applied outside their original
context. Apart from the cynical use of human rights for political ends, they maintain that any
imposition of international, read Western, human rights norms is tantamount to �moral
chauvinism and ethnocentric bias� (Schwab, 1979: 14). This seems to this author to be an
untenable position born out of misguided idealism and �political correctness�. Proponents
of this view decry Western human rights diplomacy, while taking democratic freedoms and
human rights at home for granted. M�llerson describes this position aptly as �rather
arrogant and imperialistic.� (1997:14).
Edward Said claims that non-European peoples are entitled to their own history, and he
rejects the division of mankind into distinct, immutable categories. What he argues against is
the singling out of a particular croup of people as sui generis; but he does not call for new
barriers dividing humanity in order to protect indigenous habits from (justified) criticism. To
maintain that Western norms cannot be applicable in Islamic milieus, is to subscribe
precisely to the Orientalist idea that concepts employed in the West are ipso facto irrelevant
and inapplicable in the East. Mayer continues further that
�Those who charge that comparisons of international and Islamic law on human rights
issues are Orientalist implicitly endorse the same elitist stance ... that international human
rights are the sole prerogative of members of Western societies.� (1991:9).
Furthermore, whatever the benefits of the relativist position with regard to intact traditional
societies and their habits, say the absence of the concept of private property among the
San (�Bushmen�), the application of this position with regard to societies that have
experienced decades of interaction with the West and have fundamentally and irrevocably
been transformed by this encounter, is open to serious doubt.
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The international discourse about human rights is not conducted in an institutional void, but
concerns the behaviour of states. The modern nation-state, so enthusiastically endorsed
throughout the Muslim world, is part of a cluster of legal and institutional transplants from
the West. Notions of constitutionalism and human rights developed as a reaction to the
coercive potential of the nation-state and its attendant innovations, such as a modern
bureaucracy, army, police, etc. When one is thus comparing the behaviour of Islamic
governments or the content of so-called Islamic human rights schemes with international
norms:
�One is not judging an institution of an intact traditional culture by alien Western standards
but examining Muslim�s reactions to imported legal concepts and to transplants in national
legal systems, imports and transplants that they have dealt with for decades.� (Mayer,
1991:9).
Cultural relativism, particularly when invoked by a government therefore seems little more
than �an ideological tool to serve the interest of powerful emergent groups� (Howard,
1986:17).
Political Use of Relativist Arguments
�In arguments about moral problems, relativism is the first refuge of the scoundrel.� 
(Scruton, 1994: 3 2) 
Although Islamic governments and Islamist writers do not tire to stress the exceptional
character of their religion which necessitates certain limitations or even outright violations of
human rights, their arguments neatly fit into similar pronouncements by other, non-Islamic
governments trying to justify repressive rule. The attempts to devise particularly Islamic
moral norms inevitably lead not to a distinct ethical system, but merely curtail existing rights.
Mayer rightly points out that
�The practical results of rights policies associated with governmental Islamisation programs
have simply replicated patterns of rights violations common in undemocratic countries
outside the Muslim world, violations that gave rise to the current principles of international
human rights.� (1991:xvi).
Resistance to the changes brought about by modernity is not peculiar to Islamic societies.
The resentment of an excessively individualistic culture that places undue emphasis on
entitlement, without the attendant sense of obligation, pointing out the dangers of a �me-
first-society�, all these are common phenomena in societies which are undergoing rapid
socio-political change. Such a resistance to human rights may represent an authentic
response when it comes from persons who are immersed in traditional cultures unaffected
by the impact of modernisation, or resenting this impact. But this position cannot be
regarded as genuine when it is pursued by urbanised elites in societies that have long
succumbed to the pressures of modernity. Here �communitarian rhetoric too often cloaks
the depredations of corrupt and often Westernised or deracinated elites� (Donelly, 1989:
119). M�llerson holds likewise
�Pressure to limit human rights comes from interested groups, and references to one�s
otherness � serve to conceal power interests� (1997:17).
However often the terminology of these elites invokes religious sources and authority, the
stakes in the battle over human rights standards are ultimately political. The argumentation
employed in Tanzania, China, Indonesia, or in Iran is, not surprisingly, very similar. It has
very little to do with their alleged religious or cultural idiosyncrasies, but very much to do
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very little to do with their alleged religious or cultural idiosyncrasies, but very much to do
with rationalising the preservation of peculiar, often pre-modern social and political orders
that benefit a certain elite disproportionately. �Human rights are intended to protect the
weak members of societies, the dissidents, those who want to oppose their governments.
There is no logical reason why that idea should be less valid for non-western societies�
(Baehr, 1996:19). Mayer stresses the fact that religious criteria serve the sole purpose of
diluting or negating the protection afforded by international standards while paying lip
service to the ideals of human rights that have gained too much prominence even within
their own societies to deny them outright. This is not an Islamic phenomenon but
�Part of a broader phenomenon of attempts by beneficiaries of undemocratic and
hierarchical systems to legitimize their opposition to human rights by appeals to supposedly
distinctive cultural traditions� (1991:215).
The desire to preserve elite power motivates the recourse to a highly idealised mythical past
for very pragmatic political gains. It is necessary to look behind the fa�ade of religious
rhetoric and examine the historical and societal factors, which lie at the roots of supposedly
religious phenomena. Cultural relativism, i.e. the notion that analytical and methodological
tools are inapplicable outside their original cultural context, is fundamentally flawed and ripe
for political and ideological abuse. 
Islamic Exceptionalism
The portrayal of Islam as fundamentally different, indeed the very antithesis of Christianity,
whether in its traditional Orientalist version or in its new cultural relativist guise is not based
on any inherent characteristic of either Islam per se or the societies that have become
Islamic. Having been locked in centuries of warfare and ideological competition, both
religions have come �to see in each other the very embodiment of menace and the
epitome of the �other�.� (al-Alzm, 1993:79).
Muslim societies are unquestionably different from Western societies, but that difference is
one of degree not of quality. They do not function markedly different from others, and their
behaviour, the forms in which societal tensions manifest themselves can well be explained
by reference to socio-economic pressures and universal historical forces without the need to
have recourse to the stipulations of an all-pervasive divine order that dominates these
societies.
Marriage patterns in Muslim societies, for instance, are often explained through the sunna
(model) of the prophet or Qura�nic provisions. But as Keddie (1988:79) points out
eloquently, such patterns of endogamy are by no means particular to Muslim societies but
can be found throughout the Mediterranean and are rooted not in religious law but in the
requirements of tribal politics and economy, and the perceived need to control women.
Most commentators have concentrated on the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism to
support their thesis of Islam�s exceptionalism. The foundations on which fundamentalism is
build are socio-economic, not religious. Farhang summarises this process well when he
discusses the origin of the Iranian revolution:
�The social disruptions caused by the process of modernisation could create anomie in the
classical sense, which often results in the growth of anxiety, hostility, and fantasy. �[where]
the fundamentalist can easily transform the disorientation of the individual into a collective
hatred of the other.� (1988:67).
The failure of both secularist and religious modernist to reach a functioning synthesis
between Islam and modernisation, together with persistent outside influence, has resulted in
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between Islam and modernisation, together with persistent outside influence, has resulted in
highly authoritarian and repressive governments. The process of very uneven development
and rapid modernisation has led to �dual societies� throughout the Middle East, where the
vast majority is excluded from the benefits of modernisation while becoming deeply uprooted
and alienated, not only from their traditional culture but also from their own, modernised
compatriots. The resulting disillusionment with Western modernisation that has failed to
extend the benefits of development to the poor, �has led to considerable disenchantment
with the Western model of progress generally, and ... encouraged anti-Western reaction.�
(Mayer, 1988:99).
Farhang endorses the same position, arguing that we cannot understand the fundamentalist
position in politics, particluarly with regards to general and civil rights, if we fail to
understand �the desperate existential conditions of its principal constituency - the urban
poor.� (1988:66).
Secular foundation of human rights
If one thus accept the notion of the gradual levelling of differences between societies
through the working of global historical forces, then notions like democracy and human
rights must also be subjected to a critical historical positioning. It is often assumed that the
Western Judeo-Christian tradition has been more conducive to the development of human
rights, than Eastern religions, notably Islam. Such a proposition is neither logically nor
empirically tenable. Halliday is categorical in this respect: �no derivation from any religion
is ultimately possible� (1996:140). Arthur Schlesinger (1989) concurs
�As an historian, I confess to a certain amusement when I hear the Judeo-Christian
tradition being praised as the source of our concern for human rights. In fact the great
religious ages were notable for their indifference to human rights in the contemporary
sense.�
Bertrand Russel is more candid in his criticism of the revered canon of Western tradition
�The Jews first invented the notion that only one religion could be true, but they had no
wish to convert all the world to it, and therefore only persecuted other Jews. The Christians,
retaining the Judaic belief in a special revelation, added to it the Roman desire for world-
wide dominion and the Greek taste for metaphysical subtleties. The combination produced
the most fiercely persecuting religion that the world has yet known.� (1935: 174).
To be sure, �there are traditions, including religious ones, in all nations which can be
supportive of the acceptance of human rights ideas.� (M�llerson, 1997:77). But the
development of human rights in the West was not caused by the existence of any
particularly favourable disposition in the prevailing religious climate of Europe. Rights were
necessitated by the emergence of new powerful institutions such as the centralised nation-
state and its bureaucratic and coercive innovations. By pointing out that the cultural and
political traditions of both non-western and pre-modern Western societies did neither include
the practice nor the very concept of human rights, M�llerson identifies another causal
origin. It is the vastly increased capability for intrusion into the autonomous sphere of the
individual that necessitate some kind of protective mechanism. �Therefore, a modern state
and human rights, as entitlements of the individual vis-�-vis the state, are mutually
conditioned.� (M�llerson, 1997:89).
Human rights were developed in the West because the necessary historical conditions for
their emergence appeared first in the West. They did not appear over night, but through a
long, historical development. It is thus submitted that given a sufficient level of societal, i.e.
socio-economic development, human rights will manifest themselves globally, religious or
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socio-economic development, human rights will manifest themselves globally, religious or
cultural tradition to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Islamic world is in this respect not markedly different from other parts of the world; the
resistance to the demands of globalisation will hopefully prevent the homogenisation of the
world in some form of McWorld. But such resistance must find an accommodation with
modernity as such, for the alternative to modernity would be, to paraphrase al-Azm, �to
end in the wastebin of history�.
Conclusion
Islamic societies are by no means as different from others as some of the proponents of
political Islam would like to portray it. The same applies to Western commentators who for a
variety of reasons posit Islam as the very antithesis of Western values and civilisation.
Political and religious tolerance was by no means inherent in Western religious tradition, but
occurred, fairly late if one might add, in the process of a long historical development. This
process, however, is not confined to Western industrialised societies, but can be expected
to extend to other peoples as well once the requisite socio-economic conditions are in
place. Human rights norms must be understood in their socio-economic context, they are
conditioned far more by the level of development than by any particular religious or cultural
norms.
Islamic societies have so far experienced modernisation only from the receiving end of
colonised and subjugated people. Not surprisingly, modern institutions have manifested
themselves in a very haphazard manner, in societies that have not have had sufficient time
to develop the necessary intellectual, political, and legal concepts to make sense of
modernity. Most nations in the Third World did not have a chance to find their own way into
modernity, but had it imposed on them through superior outside forces. One may deplore
this, but there appears to be no alternative in an interrelated world. Hence, the co-existence
of deeply traditional mores and customs along highly modernised sectors simultaneously in
so-called dual societies seems to be a fact of life. Anti-modernist revolutions, as 1978 in
Iran, might succeed in reversing partial aspects of this imbalance, but cannot stop the
process per se. 
These imbalances, together with their collateral of angry rejection of modernity are not an
idiosyncratic aspect of Islam, but can be witnessed throughout the underdeveloped world.
Indeed, they were an important aspect of the West�s very own modernisation progress.
One should thus refrain from ascribing to Islam any inherent capacity to either prevent that
process, to be able to offer meaningful alternatives to it. The final accommodation of Islam
with modernity, and that includes secularisation appears inevitable. Human rights issues are
finally only conceivable with a modicum of secularisation. Dogmatic objections should not
obscure the debate, for they are of secondary importance when compared to the very real
political role they play in the social enterprise.
Bibliography: 
al-Azm, Sadiq Jelal. Unbehagen in der Moderne - Aufkl�rung im Islam. Frankfurt/M.:
Fischer. 1993.
----------. �Die Moschee hat nicht immer recht�, Die Zeit. Nr. 3, 13. January 1995, p. 44.
Arkoun, Mohammed. 1984. Pour une critique de la raison islamique. Paris: Maisonneuve.
02/06/2008 22:12Kennedy School Review: Student Journal
Page 9 of 10http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ksr/volumes/2000/islamic.htm
Baehr, Peter R.. 1996. The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 2nd ed.. London:
Macmillan,
Barber, Benjamin R.. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld - How Globalism and Tribalism are
Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine Books.
Brownlie, Ian. 1997. Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd. ed.. Oxford: Clarendon.
Cassese, Antonio. 1994. Human Rights in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity Press.
----------. International Law in a Divided World. Oxford: Clarendon. 1994.
Donelly, J. 1989, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
Dwyer, Kevin. 1991.Arab Voices - The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East. London:
Routledge.
Eide, Asbjorn & Hagtvet, Bernt. 1992. Human Rights in Perspective - A Global Assessment.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Farhang, Mansour. 1988. �Fundamentalism and Civil Rights in Contemporary Middle
Eastern Politics�. In Leroy S. Rouner (ed.). Human Rights and the World�s Religions.
Notre Dame/IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Halliday, Fred. 1996. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the
Middle East. London: Tauris.
Howard, Rhoda E. 1986. Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa. Totowa/NJ: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Keddie, Nikki R. 1988. �The Rights of Women in Contemporary Islam�. In Leroy S.
Rouner (ed.). Human Rights and the World�s Religions. Notre Dame/IN: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. 1988. �The Dilemmas of Islamic Identity�. In Leroy S. Rouner (ed.).
Human Rights and the World�s Religions. Notre Dame/IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
----------. 1991. Islam and Human Rights - Tradition and Politics. London: Pinter.
Mawdudi, Abul A�la. 1980. Human Rights in Islam. 2nd ed. Leicester: Islamic Foundation.
Moyser, George (ed.). 1991. Politics and Religion in the Modern World. London: Routledge.
M�llerson, Rein. 1997. Human Rigths Diplomacy. London: Routledge.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1980. �The Concept and Reality of Freedom in Islam and Islamic
Civilisation�. In Alan S. Rosenbaum (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights - International
Perspectives. pp. 95-101. Westport/Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Norton, Augustus Richard (ed.). 1996. Civil Society in the Middle East. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Robertson, A.H. & Merrills, J.G.. 1996. Human Rights in the World. Manchester: MUP.
Rosenbaum, Alan S. (ed.). 1980. The Philosophy of Human Rights - International
Perspectives. Westport/Conn.: Greenwood Press.
02/06/2008 22:12Kennedy School Review: Student Journal
Page 10 of 10http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ksr/volumes/2000/islamic.htm
Perspectives. Westport/Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Said, Abul Aziz. 1979. �Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives�. In Admantia Pollis &
Peter Schwab (eds.). Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. New York:
Praeger.
Said, Abdul Aziz & Nasser, Jamil. 1980. �The Use and Abuse of Democracy in Islam�. In
Jack L. Nelson & Vera M. Green. International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues.
Stanfordville: Coleman.
Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
----------. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Schacht, Joseph. 1962. An Introduction to Muslim Law. Oxford: Clarendon.
Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. 1989 July 23. �The Opening of the American Mind�. New York
Times Book Review. 23 July 1989. p. 26.
Schwab, Peter. 1979. �Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability�. In
Admantia Pollis & Peter Schwab (eds.). Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological
Perspectives. pp. 1-18. New York: Praeger.
Scruton, Roger. 1994. Modern Philosophy, London: Sinclair-Stevenson.
Russel, Bertrand. 1935. �Western Civilization�. In: In Praise of Idleness. London: George
Allen & Unwin.
Traer, Robert (ed.). 1991.Faith in Human Rights - Support in Religious Traditions for a
Global Struggle. Washington/DC: Georgetown UP.
Zakaria, Fouad. 1986. �Human Rights in the Arab World: the Islamic Context�. In
UNESCO (ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Paris: UNESCO.
 
 
